In this paper we develop a bimodal perspective on possibility semantics, a framework allowing partiality of states that provides an alternative modeling for classical propositional and modal logics [Humberstone, 1981 , Holliday, 2015a . In particular, we define a full and faithful translation of the basic modal logic K over possibility models into a bimodal logic of partial functions over partial orders, and we show how to modulate this analysis by varying across logics and model classes that have independent topological motivations. This relates the two realms under comparison both semantically and syntactically at the level of derivations. Moreover, our analysis clarifies the interplay between the complexity of translations and axiomatizations of the corresponding logics: adding axioms to the target bimodal logic simplifies translations, or vice versa, complex translations can simplify frame conditions. We also investigate a transfer of first-order correspondence theory between possibility semantics and its bimodal counterpart.
Introduction
A standard view of the semantics of classical and intuitionistic logic associates classical logic with models based on complete states and intuitionistic logic with models based on partially ordered sets of partial states. Yet natural semantics for classical logic can also be given using models based on posets of partial states [Fine, 1975 , van Benthem, 1981 , Humberstone, 1981 . In place of intuitionistic Beth or Kripke-style semantics [Beth, 1956 , Kripke, 1965 , classical partial-state semantics uses a modified definition of satisfaction, according to which a partial state leaves the truth value of a formula undetermined just in case the formula is true at some refinement of the state and false at some refinement of the state. Technically, this definition of satisfaction is like the notion of "weak forcing" in set theory, which in effect builds into the semantics the double negation translation of classical into intuitionistic logic. As a result, the truth of a formula ϕ at a classical partial state
x is equivalent to its cofinal truth: for every refinement x of x there is a further refinement x of x such that ϕ is true at x . Topologically, this means that propositions in the classical picture are regular open sets in the Alexandrov topology on the poset, i.e., sets that are equal to the interior of their closure, in contrast to the intuitionistic picture where propositions can be arbitrary open sets. Motivations for this remodeling of classical logic range from philosophical views about the partiality of situations to a mathematical desire for simple completeness proofs that do not involve maximality or choice principles.
The application of these ideas to the semantics of classical modal logic involves a generalization of possible world semantics to a "possibility semantics," introduced in Humberstone 1981 and further developed in Holliday 2014, 2015a. In Holliday 2015a, a notion of possibility frame is shown to provide a more general semantics than standard possible world frames for characterizing classical normal modal logics, while still retaining appealing features of modal semantics, such as correspondences between modal axioms and firstorder properties of frames. Like frames for intuitionistic modal logic, possibility frames for classical modal logic are based on a partially ordered set of states with an accessibility relation. Just as the requirement that propositions be open sets in intuitionistic modal frames imposes conditions on the interplay of the partial order and accessibility relation in such frames, the requirement that propositions be regular open sets in possibility frames imposes conditions on the interplay of the partial order and accessibility relation in these frames. In §2.3, we will review the notions of frames and of satisfaction in possibility semantics.
The two distinct relations found in possibility frames suggest an alternative medium of description: a natural bimodal language with one modality for the ordering relation and one for the accessibility relation, and with the propositional connectives treated as in standard possible world semantics. The resulting bimodal perspective on possibility semantics will be our main focus in this paper.
This perspective extends earlier work. Intuitionistic modal logic can be fruitfully analyzed in terms of classical bimodal logic (cf. Wolter and Zakharyashev 1999) . Bimodal interaction axioms then capture conditions on the interplay of the ordering and accessibility relations in intuitionistic modal frames; and the translation of the intuitionistic unimodal language into the classical bimodal language parallels the definition of intuitionistic satisfaction. Possibility frames involve different conditions on the interplay of ordering and accessibility, and a different notion of satisfaction. Even so, it makes sense to continue in the bimodal vein, and indeed, to observe parallels between the results for possibility models and intuitionistic models.
Our bimodal analysis has several dimensions. Semantically, we can relate models directly between systems, and syntactically, we can relate axiomatic derivations; but underlying both connections is a notion of relative interpretation. The main result in this paper is a full and faithful translation of the basic modal logic K over possibility models into a bimodal logic with two components: an S4-type modal logic of inclusion and a logic for a partially functional modality over the inclusion structure. To this base we can add various axioms to regulate the interaction between the components, for instance, axioms expressing that the function is topologically continuous, or open, or an R-map, i.e., such that the inverse image of a regular open set is regular open. Adding interaction axioms to the target bimodal logic allows us to simplify our translation.
The paper is organized as follows. In §2, we fix our unimodal language and logics and present the basic background on intuitionistic modal semantics and classical possibility semantics. We also introduce a key "possibilization" construction taking standard relational frames to possibility frames that will be used repeatedly later on. In §3, we introduce and develop a bimodal perspective on possibility frames and their logics. We analyze a range of special axioms for functions on inclusion orders, using Sahlqvist correspondence techniques, and identify their content in the context of dynamic topological spaces [Artemov et al., 1997, Kremer and Mints, 2005] . In our core §4, we present our syntactic translation showing, via an argument involving possibility models, how the minimal modal logic for arbitrary relations can be decomposed into a bimodal logic of preorders plus partial functions taking states to unique alternatives. Using the same translation, we show how the modal logic of arbitrary serial relations can be decomposed into a bimodal logic of continuous functions over topological spaces. We thereby arrive at the following informal slogans:
where → means that the modal logic of what appears on the left can be embedded in the bimodal logic of what appears on the right. In the process of establishing these results, we give detailed combinatorial information about the relevant bimodal logics. In §4.2, we relate our translation to a composition of two famous embeddings from the classical literature on modal and intuitionistic logic: the Gödel-McKinseyTarski translation and the Gödel-Gentzen translation. Finally, in §4.3 we show how possibility semantics inspires a simpler translation of unimodal logic into a stronger bimodal logic of R-maps.
In § §5-6, we discuss the broader conceptual significance of our results, with an emphasis on the duality between system translation and designing alternative semantics for given logics. We also list a few of the many further directions that are suggested by our style of analysis, including: a transfer of frame correspondence results between classical bimodal semantics and possibility semantics, possible language extensions, and connections with logics of topologies endowed with operators as found in dynamical systems.
Intuitionistic Semantics and Possibility Semantics
In this section, we give a brief introduction to possibility semantics for classical modal logic ( § §2.3-2.4), facilitated by a brief review of the standard semantics for intuitionistic modal logic ( §2.2).
Language and Logics
We begin by fixing the first of our two languages.
Definition 2.1 (Unimodal Language and Logics). Fixing a nonempty set Prop of propositional variables, let L 1 be the language defined by the grammar
where p ∈ Prop.
A classical normal modal logic for L 1 is a set L ⊆ L 1 of formulas that is closed under uniform substitution, contains all classical propositional tautologies, contains the K axiom (p → q) → ( p → q), and is closed
the same way, except with "theorems of Heyting propositional calculus" in place of "classical propositional tautologies". As usual, let K be the smallest classical normal modal logic for L 1 . Let HK be the smallest intuitionistic normal modal logic for L 1 [Božic and Došen, 1984] .
For the semantics of classical normal modal logics, we assume familiarity with the standard relational frames F = W, R , models M = W, R, V , and the satisfaction relation relating pointed relational models to formulas of L 1 . When we want to contrast standard relational models with possibility models, we may call the former "possible world models".
Intuitionistic Frames and Models
For the semantics of intuitionistic normal modal logics, we adopt the following standard starting point.
Definition 2.2 (Intuitionistic Modal Frame
). An intuitionistic modal frame is a tuple F = S, ≤, R, P where S, ≤ is a poset, R is a binary relation on S, P is the set of all upsets in S, ≤ , and P is closed under
An intuitionistic model based on F is a tuple M = F, π such that π : Prop → P .
In the literature on intuitionistic modal logic, authors have considered a variety of first-order conditions on the interplay of ≤ and R, which ensure that P is closed under R . Rather than building such a condition into the definition of frames, we will deduce a condition in Proposition 2.5 below.
Definition 2.3 (Intuitionistic Satisfiaction). The intuitionistic satisfaction relation i between pointed intuitionistic models and formulas of L 1 is defined recursively as follows:
If M is based on an intuitionistic modal frame F = S, ≤, R, P , then an easy induction shows that for all ϕ ∈ L 1 , ϕ M i ∈ P , using the fact that the set of all upsets is closed under the i -semantic operations for the connectives, plus the assumption that P is closed under R .
Proposition 2.4 (Božic and Došen 1984) . HK is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of intuitionistic modal frames.
Let us now return to the issue raised above about the interplay of ≤ and R. We first identify a bimodal frame condition C that underlies the above closure condition on upsets. It is a familiar commutativity condition that can also be viewed as expressing a sort of bisimulation behavior. Proposition 2.5. For any poset S, ≤ and binary relation R on S, the following are equivalent:
1. The set of all upsets in S, ≤ is closed under R ;
2. ≤ and R satisfy the following condition (see Figure 1) C -if x ≤ x Ry , then ∃y: xRy ≤ y .
Proposition 2.5 can be viewed as a correspondence observation, in the sense of modal correspondence theory, although this will only become explicit with the bimodal language to be introduced later. But the argument that is needed here involves a twist. In ordinary correspondence theory, the admissible valuations for proposition letters range over all sets. Here they only range over upward-closed sets, and this gives intuitionistic correspondence theory a special flavor. 1 For instance, minimal valuations in Sahlqvist axioms (cf. Blackburn et al. 2001, §3.6 ) now need adjustment, and the resulting frame conditions become slightly more complex (cf. Rodenburg 1986) . We give a proof of Proposition 2.5 to increase the reader's familiarity with the concepts involved, and as a warm-up for our later analysis of possibility models.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. From part 2 to part 1, consider an upset X and points x, x with x ∈ R X and x ≤ x . We show that x ∈ R X, i.e., R(x ) ⊆ X. Let x Ry : then by C, there is a y such that xRy ≤ y . Since x ∈ R X, we have y ∈ X, and therefore, since X is an upset, we also have y ∈ X.
From part 1 to part 2, we derive C. Suppose that x ≤ x Ry . Now let ↓y be the principal downset generated by y : clearly then, V = S \ ↓y is an upset. Now x ∈ R V , since x Ry . By assumption 1, R V is an upset too, so we also have x ∈ R V . Unpacking this, we get the desired point y for condition C.
1 Another difference is the modal character of intuitionistic negation, at least as seen from a classical viewpoint, making simple-looking propositional formulas complex with stacked modalities in their explicit modal form.
Additional conditions on the interaction of ≤ and R make sense for intuitionistic modal logic. For our story here, we will only mention one such condition, which fills in the other corner of the commutative diagram suggested by the C condition:
O -if xRy ≤ y , then ∃x : x ≤ x Ry (see Figure 2) .
It is straightforward to show that any intuitionistic modal frame can be transformed into a modally equivalent one satisfying the O condition. In this sense, O may be assumed without loss of generality. 
Possibility Frames and Models
Possibility semantics for classical modal logic, though motivated independently, is formally similar to the semantics of intuitionistic modal logic-and we will exploit this analogy in this technical paper. Our treatment and results from this section are due to Holliday 2015a, to which we refer for further details.
One good way of understanding how classical logic arises in possibility semantics is through the following mathematical notion. In the topology of all upsets in S, ≤ , the regular open sets form a subfamily of special importance, being those sets X ⊆ S such that X = int(cl(X)), where int and cl are the interior and closure operations, respectively, on the upset topology. For X ⊆ S, cl(X) = {y ∈ S | ∃x ∈ X : y ≤ x} and int(X) = {y ∈ S | ∀x ≥ y : x ∈ X}. It is straightforward to check that the regular open sets are exactly the sets X satisfying two conditions, one that we had with intuitionistic propositions and one that is new:
• Persistence -if x ∈ X and x ≤ x , then x ∈ X;
• Refinability -if x ∈ X, then ∃x ≥ x ∀x ≥ x : x ∈ X.
Let RO(S, ≤) be the set of all regular open sets in the upset topology on S, ≤ .
Definition 2.6 (Modal Possibility Frame). A modal possibility frame is a tuple F = S, ≤, R, P where S, ≤ is a poset, R is a binary relation on S, P = RO(S, ≤), and P is closed under R .
2
A possibility model based on F is a tuple M = F, π such that π : Prop → P .
The possibility satisfaction relation is essentially as for intuitionistic modal logic, with one twist: the interpretation of disjunction is like that found in "weak" forcing in set theory (see, e.g., Jech 2008, §5.1.3).
Definition 2.7 (Possibility Satisfaction). The possibility satisfaction relation p between pointed possibility models and formulas of L 1 is as in Definition 2.3, with p in place of i , except for a different clause for ∨:
In other words, where
If M is based on a possibility frame F = S, ≤, R, P , then an easy induction shows that for all ϕ ∈ L 1 , ϕ M p ∈ P , using the fact that the set of all regular open sets is closed under the p -semantic operations for the connectives, plus the assumption that P is closed under R .
The basic completeness result for modal possibility frames is as follows:
Proposition 2.8. K is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of modal possibility frames.
We can now do for modal possibility frames what we did for intuitionistic modal frames in §2.2, analyzing the conditions on the interplay of ≤ and R that hold for all possibility frames, as well as stronger conditions that we may assume without loss of generality.
Again we start with a correspondence result appropriate to this new setting, where admissible valuations are now restricted to regular open sets. Compare the following result to Proposition 2.5, and especially, note the additional complexity in the correspondence proof given below. For notation, let x y (x and y are compatible) iff ∃z: x ≤ z and y ≤ z. Then x ⊥ y (x and y are incompatible) iff it is not the case that x y.
Proposition 2.9. For any poset S, ≤ and binary relation R on S, the following are equivalent:
2. ≤ and R satisfy the following conditions:
R.1 -if x ≤ x Ry ≤ z, then ∃y: xRy z (see Figure 3) ; R.2 -if xRy, then ∀y ≥ y ∃x ≥ x ∀x ≥ x ∃y y : x Ry (see Figure 4 ).
In particular, it follows that any modal possibility frame satisfies conditions R.1 and R.2. Note also that the condition R.1 follows from the condition C of intuitionistic modal frames. We include a proof of Proposition 2.9 as in Holliday 2015a to convey the flavor of possibility semantics and for comparison with the proof of Proposition 2.5. The reader will find it instructive to see how the restriction to regular open sets again modifies the frame constraints to come out of the analysis.
Proof of Proposition 2.9. From 2 to 1, consider an X satisfying Persistence and Refinability and x ≤ x . Suppose x ∈ R X, so there is a y with x Ry and y ∈ X. Then by Refinability for X, there is a z ≥ y such that (i) for all z ≥ z, z ∈ X. Since x ≤ x Ry ≤ z, by R.1 we have a y with xRy z. Given y z, (i),
and Persistence for X, we have y ∈ X, which with xRy implies x ∈ R X. Hence R X satisfies Persistence.
Next suppose that x ∈ R X, so there is a y with xRy and y ∈ X. Then by Refinability for X, there is a y ≥ y such that (ii) for all z ≥ y , z ∈ X. Since xRy ≤ y , we have an x as in R.2. From y y , (ii), and Persistence for X, we have y ∈ X, which with x Ry implies x ∈ R X. Hence we have shown that if x ∈ R X, then there is an x ≥ x such that for all x ≥ x, x ∈ R X, so R X satisfies Refinability.
From 1 to 2, suppose R.1 does not hold, so we have x ≤ x Ry ≤ z and for all y, xRy implies y ⊥ z.
Let V = {v ∈ S | v ⊥ z}, so x ∈ R V . One can check that V satisfies Persistence and Refinability, so V ∈ RO(S, ≤). Since y ≤ z, we have y ∈ V , which with x Ry implies x ∈ R V . It follows that R V does not satisfy Persistence, so R V ∈ RO(S, ≤). Hence V ∈ RO(S, ≤) is not closed under R .
Next suppose that R.2 does not hold, so we have xRy and a y ≥ y such that (iii) ∀x ≥ x ∃x ≥ x ∀y :
x Ry implies y ⊥ y . Let V = {v ∈ S | v ⊥ y }, so V satisfies Persistence and Refinability as above. Since y ≥ y, y ∈ V , which with xRy implies x ∈ R V . But by (iii), ∀x ≥ x ∃x ≥ x : x ∈ R V . Thus, R V does not satisfy Refinability, so R V ∈ RO(S, ≤). Hence V ∈ RO(S, ≤) is not closed under R .
3
In stark contrast to the case of intuitionistic frames, with possibility frames we can assume without loss of generality that something much stronger holds, namely that the accessibility relation R is partially functional. This creates a connection with logics of functions on topological spaces, which we discuss in §3.4.
The proof of the next proposition can be found in Holliday 2015a.
Proposition 2.10. For every modal possibility frame F, there is a modal possibility frame F with an accessibility relation R such that:
1. R is partially functional and satisfies C and R.2;
By contrast, we cannot assume without loss of generality that our intuitionistic modal frames are such that R is partially functional, because over such frames the principle (ϕ ∨ ψ) → ( ϕ ∨ ψ) is valid. While this principle might make sense for some interpretations of (e.g., intuitionistic provability), it is not a theorem of the minimal intuitionistic normal modal logic HK. Note how the departure from intuitionistic disjunction in Definition 2.7 is crucial for opening up the functional option in possibility semantics.
Also note that in the case of functional possibility frames, the C condition says that the function is monotonic with respect to the ordering ≤.
Observation 2.11 (Monotonicity). If R is partially functional, and f is the associated partial function, then the C condition is equivalent to:
If moreover R is functional, then the C condition is equivalent to:
Thus, Proposition 2.10 shows that we can assume without loss of generality that the accessibility relations in our modal possibility frames are (partial) monotonic functions.
The interplay conditions between ≤ and R that we have reviewed for intuitionistic frames in §2.2 and for possibility frames in this section clearly cry out for a bimodal analysis, which we will give in §3.
From World Models to Possibility Models
Possibility models and possible world models for modal logic are systematically related. A key construction for our purposes will be the following from Holliday 2015a.
Definition 2.12 (Functional Powerset Possibilization). Given a possible world model M = W, R, V , define
This construction produces a possibility model and preserves satisfaction of formulas as follows. and the intuitionistic propositional logic of such frames for arbitrary W is Skvortsov's [1979] "logic of infinite problems." We will return to this connection below (see Remark 3.10).
The powerset possibilization can also be carried out at the level of frames, taking a possible world frame
is the set of all principal upsets in the poset W ℘ , ≤ plus ∅. It is easy to see from Lemma 2.13 that these frames validate exactly the same modal formulas. However, there can be no such general construction in the other direction. For there are possibility frames whose logics are not sound with respect to any possible world frame (see Holliday 2015a),
i.e., possibility frames that give rise to "Kripke-inconsistent" and hence Kripke-incomplete logics.
If we go to "general frame" versions of possible world frames and possibility frames, then there is a general duality going back and forth (see Holliday 2015a), but we will not need this further analysis here.
Bimodal Perspective on Possibility Frames and Their Logics
In this section, we develop a bimodal approach to possibility frames that is analogous to bimodal approaches to intuitionistic modal frames (see, e.g., Wolter and Zakharyashev 1999) . For a detailed study of modal logics with families of operators and their properties, we refer to Gabbay et al. 2003 .
Language and Semantics
We now move from the unimodal language of Definition 2.1 to the following bimodal language.
Definition 3.1 (Bimodal Language). Given a nonempty set Prop of propositional variables, let L 2 be the language defined by the grammar
where p ∈ Prop. As usual for existential dual notions, let ≤ ϕ := ¬[≤]¬ϕ and R ϕ := ¬[R]¬ϕ. We will also find many uses for the defined "cofinality modality"
The semantics of this bimodal language is totally standard over models with two accessibility relations.
We interpret formulas of L 2 in models M = F, V based on birelational frames F = S, ≤, R , with [≤] as the box modality for the ≤ relation and [R] as the box modality for the R relation. Given an intuitionistic frame or possibility frame F = S, ≤, R, P , we obtain a standard birelational frame F = S, ≤, R by dropping the set P of admissible propositions. As usual, one may think of the set of admissible propositions in a standard birelational frame as ℘(S).
The following fact about the semantics of the cofinality modality 
, where as before, for X ⊆ S, cl(X) = {y ∈ S | ∃x ∈ X : y ≤ x} and
2.
[co]ϕ M is a regular open set in the upset topology on S, ≤ ;
Logics, Axioms, and Proofs
Thinking of ≤ as an ordering relation and R as an accessibility relation as in intuitionistic models and possibility models, we can consider a wide variety of bimodal logics, starting from the plain fusion
, and then adding various axioms that specialize the ordering component or the accessibility component, or the bridge between the two. The axioms that follow all reflect semantic constraints that we have encountered before, but as we shall see, they also have an independent interest. Definition 3.3 (Bimodal Logics). We will consider normal extensions of S4 ⊗ K obtained by adding some of the following axioms:
We adopt the following naming convention for extensions of the basic fusion system S4 ⊗ K: the logic
is the smallest normal bimodal logic that extends the fusion X ⊗ Y of the logic X for [≤] and the logic Y for [R] with the bimodal interaction axioms Z 1 . . . Z n . Standard notation for this would be
but for cleanliness we will use the X-Y-Z 1 . . . Z n format. Let P be the extension of K for [R] with the P axiom for [R] . Let F be the extension of K for [R] with the F axiom for [R] . Then S4-F is the extension of S4-K with the F axiom, S4-F-C is the extension of S4-F with the interaction axiom C, and so on.
Intuitively, the axioms listed here express properties linking the two relations so that intuitionistic modal semantics or possibility semantics gets the right preservation properties, as studied earlier. Alternatively, the axioms may be viewed as describing properties of functions on topological spaces that preserve less or more natural structure. We will explain the topological perspective in §3.4. For now, let us observe how one of the key semantic results of §2.3 has a precise syntactic analogue in this bimodal setup.
With the context of Fact 3.2, the R axiom has a clear meaning: the result of applying the
R is the operation from Definitions 2.2 and 2.6, the meaning of R can be equivalently stated as: the set of regular open sets is closed under R . Recall that the closure of the set of regular open sets under R was exactly the topic of Proposition 2.9, which showed that such closure is equivalent to the poset satisfying the conditions R.1 and R.2. It is no accident that we also have axioms labeled as 'R.1' and 'R.2' in Definition 3.3. In §3.3, we will show that the axioms R.1 and R.2 correspond to the frame conditions R.1 and R.2, respectively. Thus, the syntactic analogue of the semantic Proposition 2.9 is the following. Proof. We prove the fact in three parts. First, we show that given S4 for [≤], R.2 is equivalent to the left-to-right direction of the R axiom:
From R → to R.2, the antecedent of R.2 implies the antecedent of R → given the T axiom for [≤] .
Second, we show that given S4 for [≤], R.1 implies the right-to-left direction of the R axiom:
Taking ϕ := ≤ ψ, as an instance of R.1 we have
≤ ≤ ψ, which with the T axiom for
Third, we show that given S4 for [≤], the R axiom implies the R.1 axiom. From R → and the normality Fact 3.4 is a striking example of how we can drive semantic facts from the metatheory of possibility models down into syntactic facts with our bimodal object language. We will see more examples in §4.3.
Remark 3.5. One further general perspective on what we are doing here, and also elsewhere in this paper, is the remarkable fact that, inside simple-looking logics such as modal S4, defined modalities of the special forms ♦ϕ and ♦ ϕ generate rich sublogics whose validities can be surprising. Typical deductive information of this kind will be found in §4.1 when proving the correctness of our main translation.
Correspondence over Birelational Frames
We can analyze all of the axioms listed in Definition 3.3 in terms of standard modal frame correspondence (see Blackburn et al. 2001, Ch. 3) . In fact, this analysis is straightforward, since all of the axioms have a syntactic Sahlqvist form, either explicitly, or via some simple manipulation.
Proposition 3.6 (Frame Correspondence). For any birelational frame F = S, ≤, R :
2. if R is functional, then the C axiom is valid over F iff R is monotonic as a function with respect to ≤ (recall Observation 2.11);
which by Proposition 2.9 is equivalent to RO(S, ≤) being closed under R .
Proof. We do one case explicitly just to familiarize the reader with the setting. But we emphasize once more that there is a general algorithm transforming Sahlqvist-type axioms into first-order frame equivalents.
For part 4, suppose F satisfies R.1 and M is a model based on F with a state x such that M,
p, which with z ≥ z implies M, z ≤ p, as desired. Now suppose F does not satisfy R.1, so we have x ≤ x Ry ≤ z but for all y, xRy implies y ⊥ z. Then following the proof of Proposition 2.9, define a model M on F with a valuation V such that V (p) = {v ∈ S | v ⊥ z}, recalling that v ⊥ z means there is no u such that u ≥ v and u ≥ z. Then observe that M,
Similarly, one can prove part 5 by following the relevant parts of the proof of Proposition 2.9. Alternatively, it suffices to note that the equivalent contrapositive form of R.2 is a Sahlqvist formula.
Part 6 follows from parts 4-5 together with the observation in Fact 3.4 that the R axiom is equivalent to the conjunction of the R.1 and R.2 axioms relative to S4 for [≤].
These correspondence results establish soundness of the earlier bimodal logics for their intended models.
However, the Sahlqvist Completeness Theorem (see again Blackburn et al. 2001, p. 210 ) applied to the above axioms also yields something more.
Theorem 3.7 (Completeness). For any normal extension L of S4-K obtained by adding axioms among those in Proposition 3.6, L is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of birelational frames with the corresponding properties.
From Propositions 3.6.6 and 2.9 and Theorem 3.7, it follows that S4-K-R is The Bimodal Logic of Possibility Frames in the following sense.
Theorem 3.8 (The Bimodal Logic of Possibility Frames). S4-K-R is sound and complete with respect to the class of all birelational frames S, ≤, R obtained from possibility frames S, ≤, R, P .
Similarly, S4-P-R is The Bimodal Logic of Partially Functional Possibility Frames and S4-F-R is The Bimodal Logic of Functional Possibility Frames. Now that we know the frame conditions corresponding to our bimodal axioms, we can see that for any possible world model, its functional powerset possibilization as in Definition 2.12 is a model of a strong bimodal logic. The following lemma is a key tool that we will use repeatedly.
Lemma 3.9 (Powerset Possibilizations Bimodally). For any model M = W, R, V :
It is straightforward to check that the M ℘ f satisfies the frame conditions that correspond to the specified axioms according to Proposition 3.6. 
Grz is valid on a frame S, ≤, R iff ≤ is a Noetherian partial order, i.e., a partial order that contains no infinite chain of distinct elements (see, e.g., Chagrov and Zakharyaschev 1997, p. 83) . In fact, the logic of [≤] over finite powerset possibilizations is exactly the modal logic Medv of Medvedev frames, i.e., frames S, ≤ where S = ℘(W ) \ {∅} for some nonempty finite W and x ≤ y iff x ⊇ y. Medv is a proper extension of Grz, though it is not finitely axiomatizable [Prucnal, 1979] and even its recursive axiomatizability is an open question (cf. Shehtman 1990 , Holliday 2015b . Medvedev frames arise naturally in the analysis of constructive mathematics as a logic of "finite problems" [Medvedev, 1966] , and they have re-emerged recently in the semantics of questions in natural language as setting directions of inquiry [Ciardelli, 2009] . However, since our main focus in this paper is not on the pure logic of [≤], we will formulate most of our results to follow in terms of S4 for the sake of familiarity.
Dynamic Topological Spaces
Our bimodal frames and the above axioms may have seemed to be merely generated by the technical needs of possibility semantics. However, there is an independent interest to the structures we have found, especially when the accessibility relation is a partial or total function. One interesting connection is with an earlier framework extending the usual topological semantics for modal logic to spaces where the topology also has a "dynamics" in the form of a transformation taking the space to itself, usually, a continuous map as in dynamical systems (see Kremer and Mints 2005 and Bezhanishvili 2007) . Definition 3.12 (Dynamic Topological Semantics). Given a dynamic topological model M = S, T , f, V , we define an interpretation function · M : L 2 → ℘(S) as follows:
Again we can analyze what relevant structure means in terms of bimodal axioms.
Proposition 3.13 (Frame Correspondence). For any dynamic topological space F = S, T , f : [Carnahan, 1973] ,
These correspondences now work over topological spaces, which is a generalized setting compared to the relational frames for bimodal logic that we considered earlier on. However, similar reasoning applies. A proof for clause 1 is available in the literature (see again Kremer and Mints 2005) . To familiarize the reader with this reasoning style, we give the proofs for parts 2 and 3.
Proof. For part 2, from left to right, given an open set O in T , we must show that
For part 3, from left to right, assuming that O is regular open, we must show that f
is regular open and f is an R-map,
Here is one basic completeness theorem from the literature.
Theorem 3.14 (Artemov et al. 1997 ). The logic S4-F-C is sound and complete with respect to the class of dynamic topological spaces with continuous maps.
Our analysis adds new results of this sort, of which we formulate one.
Theorem 3.15 (Logic of R-maps). The logic S4-F-R is sound and complete with respect to the class of dynamic topological spaces with R-maps.
Proof. By Fact 3.4, R is equivalent to the conjunction of R.1 and R.2, which are both Sahlqvist formulas.
Therefore, S4-F-R is relationally sound and complete. This implies that S4-F-R is sound and complete with respect to dynamic topological spaces based on Alexandroff spaces with R-maps. Thus, by Proposition 3.13.3, S4-F-R is also sound and complete with respect to all dynamic topological spaces with R-maps.
Bimodal Perspective on Possibility Semantics via Translations
Many of our earlier observations can be summed up in a particularly simple format, that of a relative interpretation of possibility logics into bimodal logics via suitable translations. In this section we state the main results of this paper, providing a translation of basic modal logic into bimodal logics based on possibility semantics. We will prove that this translation is full and faithful. We will also show how our translation is related to two classic ones from the literature, being a composition of a Modal Gödel-Gentzen translation of the basic modal logic into intuitionistic modal logic and an Extended Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski translation of intuitionistic modal logic into bimodal logic. Finally, we will show how the translation can be simplified if we strengthen the bimodal logic to a logic of possibility frames.
Translating Possibility Logic into Bimodal Logic
Here is our first translation of unimodal logic over possibility models into bimodal logic.
Definition 4.1 (g translation).
Define a function g : L 1 → L 2 recursively as follows:
Using the g translation, we will show that the unimodal logic of an arbitrary relation can be "decomposed" 
Theorem 4.2 (Embedding I). For all formulas
To prove the left-to-right direction of Theorem 4.2, we need a lemma whose proof tell us quite a bit about the deductive power of even the weak fusion logic S4-K.
Lemma 4.3 (Persistence and Refinability). For all formulas ϕ ∈ L 1 :
Proof. The proof of part 1 is by induction on ϕ.
For the atomic case,
which is an instance of the 4 axiom.
, which is an instance of the 4 axiom. For the case,
, which is an instance of the 4 axiom.
For the ∧ case, the inductive hypothesis is that
The proof of part 2 is also by induction on ϕ.
For the ¬ case, [co]g(¬ϕ) → g(¬ϕ) is [co][≤]¬g(ϕ) → [≤]¬g(ϕ).
We will show that the contrapositive
by the normality of [≤] . Next, part 1 gives us S4-K g(ϕ) → [≤]g(ϕ) and hence
by the normality of
For the case,
, and for any ψ,
While Lemma 4.3 will be key to proving the left-to-right direction of Theorem 4.2, showing that if K proves ϕ then even the weak fusion S4-K can prove g(ϕ), the following is the key to proving the right-to-left direction, showing that if the stronger logic S4-P proves g(ϕ), then K proves ϕ. 
Proof. The proof is an easy induction on ϕ, using the definition of g and the fact that M ℘ , X [co]ϕ holds iff ∀X ⊆ X ∃X ⊆ X such that M ℘ , X ϕ, which holds iff ∀x ∈ X, M ℘ , {x} ϕ.
We are now prepared to prove Theorem 4.2.
Proof of Theorems 4.2. For the right-to-left direction of Theorem 4.2, if K ϕ, then by the completeness of K with respect to the class of possible world models, there is such a model that falsifies ϕ. Thus, by Lemmas 3.9.1 and 4.4, there is a S4-P model M ℘ f (indeed, this is a model of a much stronger logic, a point to which we will return below) that falsifies g(ϕ), so S4-P g(ϕ). In all, this is a simple semantic argument using standard completeness plus the powerset possibilization construction.
The argument for the converse direction of both parts is a direct combinatorial analysis of axioms and proofs, but its details are less obvious than the reader might expect, since we need to investigate how even simple classical propositional reasoning transforms under our translation with various added modalities. Our strategy is as follows. We first show that the translation of any propositional tautology is a theorem of S4-K.
We start with some auxiliary observations. Given any propositional formula ϕ, consider an equivalent disjunctive normal form
where I ⊆ N and
Now suppose there is an
and hence
for some i ∈ I, which with the reflexivity of ≤ implies
Define a propositional valuation v : Prop → {0, 1} by v(p) = 1 iff ∀y ≥ x ∃y ≥ y: M, y p. Then it follows from (3) that v(p) = 1 for all p ∈ P i , and v(q) = 0 for all q ∈ Q i , and this in turn impliesv(ϕ D ) =v(ϕ) = 1, wherev is the usual classical extension of v.
So we have shown that if the translation g(ϕ) of a propositional formula ϕ is satisfiable in an S4-K model, then ϕ is satisfiable by an ordinary propositional valuation.
Now if there is a propositional formula ψ such that S4-K g(ψ), then by the completeness of S4-K, there is an S4-K model with M, x g(ψ) and hence M, x ¬g(ψ). By Lemma 4.3.2, M,
. Then what we showed above implies that ¬ψ is satisfiable by a propositional valuation. Thus, ψ is not a propositional tautology. Hence if ψ is a propositional tautology, then S4-K g(ψ).
Second, we observe that using the special forms produced by the translation g and the laws of S4-K, we can match applications of modus ponens that were made in K. Suppose S4-K g(ϕ) and S4-K g(ϕ → ψ),
, so by modus ponens in
Third, we show that the g translation of the K axiom for is a theorem of S4-K. The translation is
We claim that
from which it follows by Necessitation for [≤] that (4) is a theorem of S4-K.
, so by the normality of
. Thus, from the antecedent of the main conditional in (5) we can derive in S4-K that Finally, we observe that with g and S4-K we can match applications of Necessitation in K:
,
by Necessitation for [R], the T axiom for ψ → ≤ ψ, and Necessitation for [≤] .
The proof of Theorem 4.2 shows that g also embeds K into S4-K. Recall that in possibility semantics, we may assume without loss of generality that the accessibility relation is partially functional-but this is not required. Non-functional relations serve as well. Similarly, the g translation works fine into a bimodal logic without the partial functionality axiom P for [R] . Of course, there are completely trivial translations of K into S4-K, such as the translation that simply switches to [R] , so the fact that g embeds K into S4-K is nothing special. By contrast, the fact that g embeds K into the logic S4-P with a partially functional modality is something special-not just any translation can pull this off.
Let us now move from partial to total functionality. The g translation cannot embed K into the bimodal logic S4-F with the functionality axiom F for
is inconsistent in any bimodal logic with the F axiom for [R] and the D axiom for [≤] . However, the g translation is able to embed the logic KD into a bimodal logic with the functionality axiom F for [R] . One might think that since g embeds K into S4-P, g should embed KD into S4-F. However, this overlooks the fact that the translation of the D axiom is a formula containing both [≤] and [R] modalities, so in order for the translation to be provable, we may need some interaction axioms relating [≤] and [R]. To work out the translation, first observe that since we defined ♦ϕ := ¬ ¬ϕ, we have:
Thus, the translation of the D axiom, p → ♦p is:
Now we will show that this translation is not a theorem of S4-F. Figure 5 displays a bimodal frame where the solid lines are for the ≤ relation (with reflexive loops assumed but not displayed) and the dashed lines are for the R relation. Thus, the frame is an S4-F frame. Now consider a valuation that makes p false at all x i points and true at all y i points. Then one may check that g( p → ♦p) is false at point x 0 .
. . . The frame in Figure 5 violates a natural condition on the interplay of the function f , given by the dashed lines, and the ordering ≤, given by the solid lines: f is not monotonic with respect to ≤. We have
Recall from Proposition 3.6.2 that relative to functional frames, the axiom corresponding to the monotonicity of the function is the C axiom
If we add the C axiom to S4-F, we obtain the well-known dynamic topological logic S4-F-C, the logic of dynamic topological spaces with continuous functions (recall §3.4). Our second main result, building on Theorem 4.2, is that the g translation embeds KD into S4-F-C. We thus arrive at our next informal slogans:
Theorem 4.5 (Embedding II). For all formulas
Proof. In the right-to-left direction, the proof is the same as for Theorem 4.2, except we use the completeness of KD with respect to the class of serial relational models and then Lemmas 3.9.2 and 4.4.
For the left-to-right direction, we do not need the full deductive power of S4-F-C. The deductive power of S4-KD-R.1 is enough. All we need to add to the proof of Theorem 4.2 is that the g-translation of the
As an instance of the R.1 axiom, we have
, which with the instance of R.1 just given gives us
, which with the D axiom for [R] and the normality of [≤] gives
, which with the normality of
, which with necessitation for [≤] gives us that (6) is a theorem of S4-KD-R.1.
In fact, we can make the target bimodal logic even stronger, e.g., the logic S4-F-CR of topological spaces with continuous R-maps as in §3.4. The general reason is the following. 
2. if L is sound over the class of powerset possibilization of serial possible world models, then for all
Proof. We have already seen that if K ϕ, then S4-K g(ϕ), and that if KD ϕ, then S4-KD-R.1 g(ϕ).
In the other direction, if K ϕ (resp. KD ϕ) then as in the proof of Theorem 4.2 (resp. 4.5), there is a powerset possibilization of a possible world model (resp. serial possible world model) that falsifies ϕ, so if L (resp. L ) is sound over such powerset possibilizations, then L ϕ (resp. L ϕ).
Using Theorem 4.6, not only can we strengthen the logic of the [R] modality, but in light of Remark 3.10, we can also strengthen the logic of the [≤] modality. Since K and KD have the finite model property in the standard sense of possible world semantics, it follows from Remark 3.10 that we can strengthen the logic of the [≤] modality all the way to the strong logic Medv.
But of course there is a limit to strengthening the target bimodal logic. As an example, let us show that the g translation does not faithfully embed K into S4-P-O, where O is the axioms for open maps in the topological context of §3.4.
Proof. The contrapositive of the O axiom is R ≤ ϕ → ≤ R ϕ, which with the partial functionality axiom
The original translation of Gödel [1933a] and Gentzen [1933 Gentzen [ , 1936 was for the language of firstorder logic. For classical propositional calculus (CPC) and intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC), their results establish the following.
Theorem 4.12 (Gödel-Gentzen) . For all propositional formulas ϕ, CPC ϕ iff IPC ϕ G .
For the modal language, as Božic and Došen [1984, p. 231-2] observe, adding double negations in front of box formulas suffices to obtain an embedding of K into HK.
Theorem 4.13 (Božic and Došen 1984) . For all formulas ϕ ∈ L 1 , K ϕ iff HK ϕ G .
Now it is easy to show that our earlier translation g is essentially a composition of these two. Although
is not guaranteed to be syntactically the same as (ϕ G ) G , since (ϕ G ) G may have some double negations that disappear in g(ϕ), they are equivalent in the following sense.
Fact 4.14 (Composition). For all formulas
ϕ ∈ L 1 , K-K g(ϕ) ↔ (ϕ G ) G .
The Simplified Possibility Translation
We will now show that we can do better than composing the Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski and Gödel-Gentzen translations-we can give a simpler translation of unimodal logic into bimodal logics of preorders plus partial functions-provided we strengthen the target bimodal logic with the key axiom R of possibility frames. The price we pay for the simplified p translation is that we must strengthen the bimodal logic into which we embed K. One can see this by noting that while ¬¬ p → p is a theorem of K, its translation,
is not a theorem of S4-P, since one can obviously construct a model of S4-P that falsifies the formula. Does this formula look familiar? Indeed,
is exactly the R axiom from Definition 3.3! This observation shows that any bimodal logic into which we embed K via the p translation must include the axiom R. Not only is R necessary, but also adding R to the base logic S4-K is sufficient: we will show that the p translation embeds K into S4-K-R, The Logic of Possibility Frames. This is a syntactic analogue of the semantic fact that K is sound and complete with respect to the class of all possibility models.
Theorem 4.16 (Embedding III). For all formulas
To prove this, we first need an analogue of Lemma 4.3 for the p translation.
Lemma 4.17 (Persistence and Refinability). For any ϕ ∈ L 1 :
Proof. The proof is by induction on ϕ. The atomic, ¬, and ∧ cases are the same as in the proof of Fact
. First, the inductive hypothesis give us
is an instance of the R.1 axiom, which follows from the R axiom given S4 for [≤] (Fact 3.4). Third, the inductive hypothesis gives us that S4-K-R [co]p(ϕ) → p(ϕ). Given the previous three implications and the normality of
The inductive hypothesis is that
Part 1 gives us
Since
is an instance of the R.2 axiom, which follows from the R axiom given
Next, we need an analogue of Lemma 4.4 for the p translation. 
Proof. The proof of the equivalence is an easy induction on ϕ, using the definition of p and fact that M ℘ , X
[co]ϕ holds iff ∀X ⊆ X ∃X ⊆ X such that M ℘ , X ϕ, which holds iff ∀x ∈ X, M ℘ , {x} ϕ.
We are now prepared to prove Theorem 4.16.
Proof of Theorem 4.16. For the right-to-left direction, if K ϕ, then by the completeness of K with respect to the class of possible worlds models, there is such a model that falsifies ϕ. Thus, by Lemmas 3.9.1 and
. From left to right, the proof that the p-translation of any tautology is a theorem of S4-K is the same as for the g-translation in the proof of Theorem 4.2, but using Lemma 4.17 instead of Lemma 4.3. The proof that with p and S4-K-R we can match applications of modus ponens in K is also the same.
Second, we show that the translation of the K axiom for is a theorem of S4-K-R. The translation is
from which it follows by the T axiom and Necessitation for [≤] that (9) is a theorem of S4-K-R.
Thus, from the antecedent of the main conditional in (10) we can derive in S4-K-R that Finally, we observe that with p and S4-K-R we can match applications of Necessitation in K:
As before, we can significantly strengthen the bimodal logic into which we embed K or KD. For example, we can embed K into S4-P-R, The Logic of Partially Functional Possibility Frames, and we can embed KD into S4-F-R, The Logic of Functional Possibility Frames, which we showed in §3.4 is also the logic of dynamic topological spaces with R-maps. These claims are consequences of the following general result. 
Proof. The argument is the same as in the proof of Theorem 4.6, only using Theorem 4.16 instead of 4.2.
For part 2, we also need to show that the p translation of the D axiom p(ϕ) → ♦p(ϕ) is derivable in S4-KD-R. The translation is
As an instance of the R.1 axiom, which follows from R given S4 (11) is a theorem of S4-KD-R.
Also as before, there is a limit to strengthening the target bimodal logic. For example, the p translation does not faithfully embed K into S4-P-OR. In the topological setting of §3.4, this is the logic of topological spaces with open R-maps.
where the last line uses Lemma 4.17.2 for S4-K-R. Hence S4-P-OR p(♦p → p).
Further Directions
The notions and results presented in this paper invite further investigation along a number of lines.
Exploiting the Translation: Correspondence
We have established our translations and embeddings for theoretical reasons, without an eye to practical purposes. Still, there are several further uses that could be made of the translations. In particular, it would be possible to make concrete comparisons of proofs in possibility style with proofs in bimodal style. Our arguments in §4 already provided many relevant examples, where issues arise such as the role of intermediate bimodal formulas that do not themselves occur as translations of possibility formulas. Somewhat more technically, we can also use our translation to define bimodal companions for possibility logics, and compare the two landscapes for automatic transfer of properties of logics. This is in analogy with modal companions of intermediate logics for the Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski translation (see, e.g., Chagrov and Zakharyaschev 1997, Sec. 9) . We can call a bimodal logic L a bimodal companion of a modal logic L if for each modal formula,
. Similarly, we can define bimodal companions for the translation p. The theory of these companions deserves special attention and will be discussed elsewhere.
Given the analysis of semantic conditions and axioms in this paper, perhaps the most obvious topic for further analysis through our translation is frame correspondence. We provide a bit more detail on this, though a full analysis is beyond the scope of this paper: cf. Holliday 2015a for further results.
Let us say that a unimodal formula ϕ is first-order definable over possibility frames iff there is a sentence in the language of first-order logic with binary relation symbols for ≤ and R such that for any possibility frame F = S, ≤, R, P , ϕ is valid over F according to possibility semantics iff ψ is true in S, ≤, R as a first-order structure. By contrast, we say that a bimodal formula ϕ is first-order definable over bimodal frames iff there is a sentence ψ of the same first-order language such that for any bimodal frame F, ϕ is valid over F according to standard possible world semantics iff ψ is true in F as a first-order structure.
Can we translate possibility formulas ϕ and then find out their frame properties, such as first-orderness, using standard correspondence results for the formula p(ϕ) in our bimodal language? There is a difficulty in doing so, since our translation adds extra levels of modality for negations and for atoms, so even simple syntactic Sahlqvist forms may end up looking quite complex. Even so, one observation can be made.
Proposition 5.1. A unimodal formula ϕ is first-order definable over possibility frames iff its translation p(ϕ) is first-order definable over possibility frames viewed as bimodal frames.
Proof. The proof of this result uses the following observation, relying on the special syntactic form of our translation that substituted cofinality formulas ♦p for atoms p. Any possibility frame F = S, ≤, R, P is at the same time a bimodal frame S, ≤, R , and it is easy to show by induction on formulas that, for any valuation V on the bimodal frame, the resulting bimodal model makes a formula p(ϕ) true at state s iff ϕ is true (now in the sense of possibility semantics) at s in the matching possibility model whose valuation π is such that π(p) is the interior of the closure of V (p), i.e., π(p) = {x ∈ S | ∀x ≥ x ∃x ≥ x : x ∈ V (p)}.
Conversely, any admissible valuation on the possibility frame is already a valuation on the bimodal frame such that p(ϕ) is true at s in the bimodal model iff ϕ is true at s in the possibility model.
Of course, if p(ϕ) is first-order definable over all bimodal frames, then in particular it is first-order definable over those bimodal frames coming from possibility frames, so we can apply the right-to-left direction of Proposition 5.1 to show that ϕ is first-order definable over possibility frames. In this way, general bimodal correspondence theory may be brought to bear on correspondence theory for possibility semantics.
Unfortunately, as noted above, bimodal translations of possibility axioms tend to be complex, and they only yield to general Sahlqvist-style results in very simple cases. As a positive example, to see that p → p is first-order definable over possibility frames, we simply note that its
and is therefore first-order definable over all bimodal frames. Thus, p → p is first-order definable over possibility frames by Proposition 5.1. Even if for a given ϕ, p(ϕ) is not provably equivalent to a Sahlqvist formula in the basic bimodal logic K-K, this is not the end of the story. For if p(ϕ) is provably equivalent to a bimodal formula ψ in the bimodal logic S4-K-R of possibility frames, then p(ϕ) is semantically equivalent to ψ over possibility frames regarded as bimodal frames, so we may substitute ψ for p(ϕ) in Proposition 5.1. In short, we may be able to use our bimodal logic to simplify p(ϕ) into a ψ that is Sahlqvist and then apply Proposition 5.1. Moreover, if we are interested in correspondence relative to, e.g., functional possibility frames, then we may use the stronger bimodal logic S4-F-R with the axiom [R]χ ↔ R χ to try to reduce p(ϕ) to a Sahlqvist formula.
To understand the general situation, an analogy may be helpful with correspondence theory for intuitionistic logic. Here valuations only assign persistent sets (upsets) to proposition letters, and the analysis takes place on special frame classes: pre-orders, partial orders, or even trees. Both of these differences matter. Allowing only special semantic values for propositions may make certain valuations used in classical correspondence arguments unavailable, such as the "minimal valuations" that are crucial to Sahlqvist-style analysis.
5 And working on special frame classes may change correspondence behavior drastically-witness the result in van Benthem 1976 that the McKinsey axiom, and in fact, all modal reduction principles in the unimodal language, become first-order definable over transitive frames.
Instead of investigating this issue further here, we cite some relevant results from Rodenburg 1986 . First of all, many complex intuitionistic axioms turn out to be first-order when restrictions on valuations plus special frame conditions are combined. There are indeed second-order axioms, too, but these live higher up in syntactic complexity, an example being "Scott's Axiom" ((¬¬p → p) → (p ∨ ¬p)) → (¬p ∨ ¬¬p). In this setting, Rodenburg develops a tableau method for describing refutation patterns of formulas which allows him to prove, among many other things, that every intuitionistic formula in the sublanguage with ¬, ∧ only defines a first-order frame condition. Now our possibility semantics is different in two ways: it puts more restrictions on admissible valuations, and it adds an ordinary modality with its own accessibility relation, often a partial function. Nevertheless, some analogies may continue to hold.
The following point should be stressed: every possible world frame is at the same time a modally equivalent possibility frame, in which ≤ is the identity relation, so if a modal formula is not first-order definable over possible world frames, then it is not first-order definable over possibility frames either-at least not over arbitrary possibility frames. This argument does not show that, e.g., non-first-orderness over possible world frames implies non-first-orderness over possibility frames in which the modal accessibility relation is a (partial) function. Indeed, it is an open question whether we may get more first-order correspondence over functional possibility frames. Given Proposition 5.1, one way to pursue this question would be to use results about bimodal correspondence relative to frames in which one relation is a preorder and the other is function. As noted above, there are strong results for unimodal correspondence relative to preordered frames, so a natural follow-up would be to look for results in the bimodal case of a preorder plus function.
Translations, Semantics, and Logical Systems
We have presented a dense array of formal results on system translations, but what is the main thrust? We briefly list a few perhaps unusual ways of looking at our findings, without going into sustained discussion.
The way we see our analysis, several things seem noteworthy.
First, as we have shown, our approach extends well-known existing translations from classical logic into intuitionistic logic, and from intuitionistic logic into classical modal S4. We believe that this adds motivation for a more general study of modal system embeddings, where our results highlighted the linkage between syntactic translations and axiomatic strength of the logics involved. The same translation may work while the target logic gets strengthened progressively, but we also found transition points. Moreover, we showed how sometimes, stronger logics may support syntactically simpler embeddings. All of this seems suggestive material for further general theory of translations between logical systems.
5 However, there are often fixes for this, for which we refer again to Holliday 2015a.
Our translation also changes the usual view of bimodal logics as simple extensions of unimodal ones. It shows that one can decompose unimodal logics for very general classes of structures into bimodal logics for much more constrained model classes. How far does this phenomenon go? Other examples exist, such as the reanalysis of S4 into modal S5 for epistemically accessible worlds plus a temporal modality over strict partial orders [van Benthem, 2009 ]. This shows that there is more to modal logics as usually given with their prima facie semantics than meets the eye, and one would want to understand this phenomenon in general.
Perhaps of greatest interest to us, however, is another trade-off. Our bimodal embedding of possibility logic highlights the connection between two options for conceptual analysis. One can give meaning to a standard logical language in terms of a new "nonstandard" semantics, or one can translate the language and its logic into some other standard system. This is of course well-known in the case of Kripke and
Beth semantics for intuitionistic logic, but our results extend the range of examples. Again, this seems a phenomenon that needs to be understood more generally: when and how can non-standard semantics be mimicked faithfully by standard translations? There may be a trivial sense in which this can always be done,
as soon as precise non-standard truth conditions are given, since we can translate into the meta-language of the models, often a first-order language. 6 But our results use only a small part of that meta-language, staying close to the original object language, and the issue is when such small steps suffice.
Finally, here are some concrete technical open problems beyond the positive results we have presented.
We embedded unimodal logics (K, KD) into bimodal ones (S4-P, S4-K-R, etc). What about the converse direction, from these bimodal logics back to these unimodal ones? We suspect that no faithful translations exist of this kind. Also, we worked with a whole landscape of bimodal logics, but we only compared these logics in a weak way, namely, qua power for proving translated formulas from our unimodal logic. What about relative interpretations, or lack thereof, between the various bimodal logics themselves that we have introduced? A well-known difficulty in the area of relative interpretation is finding impossibility results
showing non-embeddability of logics. It would be good to complement our analysis with one that also offers such tools, to see what equalities and non-equalities of logics we have really established modulo embeddability.
Further Mathematical Perspectives
While our presentation has concentrated on logics, and in particular, classical normal modal logics, other perspectives seem worth exploring. In particular, we have seen that our bimodal embeddings use systems that make sense in topology and even the theory of dynamical systems. We see our results, therefore, as also adding to the tradition of "dynamic topological logic" [Artemov et al., 1997, Kremer and Mints, 2005] and we believe that topological models may add valuable intuitions to possibility semantics.
But one can also generalize from topology, and ask how our results will fare on weaker base logics. From a modal perspective, the obvious candidate here is neighborhood models that support weaker modal logics where does not distribute over conjunction, and only upward monotonicity remains valid [Chellas, 1980 , Hansen, 2003 ]. Can our results be extended to this weaker modal base?
One can also look at weakenings of the propositional base of our logics, going from Boolean algebra to distributive lattices or even lower. In this case, algebraic methods may become most suited, and it is relevant that a general algebraic representation theory for possibility frames has been given in Holliday 2015a. 7 Also relevant here may be the very general algebraic correspondence techniques of Conradie et al. 2014. 6 The well-known "standard translation" for modal logic shows how fruitful this method can be. 7 An order-topological duality for this algebraic semantics via descriptive possibility frames will appear in a future paper.
Language Redesign
We conclude with a standard question about non-standard semantics. Whenever we extend a class of models for a given language, the question arises whether other languages would be more appropriate for these models, perhaps making finer distinctions than the original one.
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One obvious extension of our modal base language would add an iteration modality * that allows us to talk about iterated beliefs, or iterated actions on a topological space under our functional translation.
The semantic clause for * in possibility semantics is the standard one, saying that ϕ is true at any state reachable from the current one by taking R-steps. Our main results all hold for such a PDL-type extension of our logics, starting with the key Possibilization Lemma (Lemma 2.13), which now also tells us that M ℘ f , X p * ϕ iff ∀x ∈ X: M, x * ϕ.
But perhaps more interesting are new propositional connectives arising in possibility models. The original paper of Humberstone [1981] appeared at a time when "interval semantics" for temporal expressions was 
Conclusion
We started from the recently reviving semantic paradigm of possibility models for modal logic. We then analyzed this paradigm in terms of a new embedding of modal logic into a classical bimodal logic of an inclusion order with a partial function acting on it. Using this first bridge between new and old systems, we broadened our analysis to a greater variety of bimodal logics, as well as a simplified translation. Our analysis brought to light several new systems and technical questions of axiomatizability, frame correspondence, and relative interpretability. Moreover, our results connect existing systems in new ways, for instance, linking possibility semantics to dynamic topological logic.
This can be seen as a contribution to technical modal logic, but we also see a more general philosophical thrust. In much of the philosophical literature, conceptual innovation is equated with providing new semantics, or put in other terms, moving toward "non-standard logics". While this is indeed one fruitful methodology, there is always the alternative of deconstructing alternative semantics and logics in terms of translations into more classical systems. This paper is one more instance of this illuminating duality.
